Lost in transmission: Testimonial justification and practical reason by Peet, Andrew & Pitcovski, Eli
 Lost in Transmission: Testimonial Justification and Practical Reason 
Andrew Peet and Eli Pitcovski 
Abstract 
 
Transmission views of testimony hold that the epistemic state of a speaker can, in some robust 
sense, be transmitted to their audience. That is, the speaker's knowledge or justification can become 
the audience's knowledge or justification via testimony. We argue that transmission views are 
incompatible with the hypothesis that one's epistemic state, together with one's practical 
circumstances (one's interests, stakes, ability to acquire new evidence etc.), determines what actions 
are rationally permissible for an agent. We argue that there are cases where, if the speaker's 
epistemic state were (in any robust sense) transmitted to the audience, then the audience would be 
warranted in acting in particular ways. Yet, the audience in these cases is not warranted in acting in 
the relevant ways, as their strength of justification does not come close to the speaker's. So 
transmission views of testimony are false. 
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Background 
Transmission views of testimony maintain that epistemic states can be transmitted between agents. 
That is, they hold that when an agent acquires testimonial knowledge or justification through 
accepting a speaker's testimony they do so by acquiring someone else's (standardly the speaker's) 
knowledge or justification (Burge 1993, 1997, Faulkner 2010, Hardwig 1985, 1991, McDowell 
1994, Owens 2000, 2006, Schmitt 2006, Welbourne 1986, Williamson 2000, and Wright 2016).   
Transmission views have not gone unchallenged. They have been the subject of attacks by 
Lackey (1999), and MacFarlane (2005).  However, these objections have been limited in scope.  
Rather than targeting the general notion that epistemic states are transmitted from speaker to hearer 
they target the notion that one specific epistemic state, knowledge, is transmitted via testimony.  
According to MacFarlane, given subject sensitive invariantism, standards for knowledge may 
depend on pragmatic circumstances, so an audience can fail to have knowledge even if they inherit 
the purely epistemic aspects of the speaker’s belief (MacFarlane (2005: 134)). According to 
Lackey, an audience can sometimes gain knowledge that p which the speaker does not possess. 
However, the subject in Lackey’s cases still possesses justification to believe p. Thus, as Wright 
 (2016) points out, it is compatible with Lackey’s cases that the agent’s justification is transmitted. 
Both objections fail to target the core notion that epistemic states are transmitted from speaker to 
hearer. Transmission theorist can make the correct predictions if they focus on justification 
transmission and slightly revise their notion of knowledge transmission. 
The target of our objection is the transmission theorist's core thesis. There are cases in which 
if the hearer were to inherit the speaker's epistemic state (or certain aspects of the speaker's 
epistemic state, such as their justification or knowledge), then they would be justified in acting upon 
it.  However, they are not justified in acting upon that epistemic state. Thus, in these cases, hearers 
fail to inherit the epistemic aspects of the speaker's belief.
1
 Our argument will focus on the notion of 




Central to the transmission hypothesis is the idea that in many cases of testimonial knowledge or 
justification the audience, in a very substantive sense, receives the speaker's knowledge or 
justification. As transmission is standardly understood, this is an all or nothing affair (see Wright 
2014).
2
 For the transmission theorist, unless the audience possesses a defeater
3
 the audience's 
strength of justification will match the speaker's.  This assumption will play a key role in our 
argument against transmission, which is as follows: 
 
                                                          
1 In a sense our point is the converse of MacFarlane's.  Macfarlane presents cases in which, even if epistemic 
properties were transmitted, the audience would not know.  We present cases in which, if epistemic properties were 
transmitted, the audience would be justified in acting. 
2 Though Wright (2014) and Faulkner (2000: 591) are the most explicit, it is trivially implied by other transmission 
views. For instance: Owens (2006: 120) and Schmitt (2006) agree that the audience’s belief will be based on “the 
very grounds” on which the speaker’s belief is based (although we will later suggest that Schmitt at least has the 
resources to adopt a weaker version of the transmission thesis according to which only part of the speaker’s 
justification is transmitted). Burge (1993: 465) compares transmission to memory which, in turn, “simply maintains 
in justificational space a cognitive content with its judgmental force”. And McDowell (1994) holds that when one 
testifies one puts into the public domain (and thereby makes available to others) one’s standing in the space of 
reasons. 
3 Or unless practical factors (such as the stakes) affect justification.  Our argument accounts for such factors.  
 Premise 1:  If one is deliberating about whether or not to preform H (some high-stakes course of 
action) and some proposition p, for which one has very little evidence, is decisive for the correct 
decision with respect to H, then if 1. One is told that p by a first expert, and 2. One is aware that 
there is a second expert immediately available for a second opinion with an extremely low cost, 
then one should obtain the second opinion before one acts. This is illustrated by the following case: 
 
Medical Opinion I: A team of doctors have narrowed down your condition to one of two: 
Either you have Condition-A or you have condition-B. The treatment for condition-A is the 
amputation of one arm. The treatment for condition-B is the amputation of one leg. Both 
conditions are such that if you don't get treated within one month, both of your arms and 
both of legs will fall off. Finally, after running the relevant tests, each doctor is available to 
deliver their verdict. You know each doctor is respected, and you have no reason to believe 
they will disagree, but you also don't know that they will agree. The first doctor you consult 
says "you have condition-A, you should have your arm amputated". It seems irrational for 
you to go straight to surgery and have your arm amputated without hearing what the doctor 




Premise 2: The amount of justification necessary/sufficient for one to rationally act on a belief that 
p varies with the stakes (and other practical factors). When the stakes for agent A (with respect to p) 
are higher than the stakes of another agent B, and A and B are identical in all other practical 
respects (e.g. in the availability of further evidence), the amount of justification sufficient (for 





                                                          
4 Anderson (2015) and Anderson and Hawthorne (forthcoming) present similar cases and share our verdict about the 
impact of practical factors such as additional available evidence on the rationality of action. 
5   This principle is closely related to the following principle: 
 
Stakes Dependence: when the stakes for agent A (with respect to p) are higher than the stakes of another agent B, 
the amount of justification necessary/sufficient (for acting on p) for A cannot be lower than the amount of 
justification necessary/sufficient for B (to act on p).  
  
Premise 3: From justification transmission views of testimony, together with premise 2 it follows 
that: 
 
Degree Transmission: if a speaker is practically situated with respect to p in such a way 
that acting on p requires very-strong justification, yet they nonetheless have enough 
justification to act on p, then if they assert p to an audience who is practically situated in 
such a way that a lower degree of justification (merely strong justification) is required for 
action and the audience is otherwise practically situated in a parallel way to the speaker, 
then the audience thereby acquires enough justification to act on p (assuming that the 
audience has no defeaters). 
 
Premise 4: Degree Transmission is inconsistent with Premise 1. This is illustrated by the 
following case: 
 
Medical Opinion II: Picture the case given in support of premise 1. However, add to it that 
your father is a mob boss and will assassinate any doctor who recommends the wrong 
treatment (since your father knows you either have condition-A or condition-B it will be 
easy for him to tell when the wrong treatment was carried out). The doctors know this. Thus, 
the stakes are extremely high for the doctors, even higher than they are for you. Nonetheless 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
Stakes Dependence is called into question by Anderson (2015), and Anderson and Hawthorne (forthcoming), who 
argue that practical factors other than the stakes can intervene and affect the amount of justification required for 
permissible action. Our principle allows for such factors . To deny our principle would have amount to maintaining that 
epistemically permissible action depends on factors other than the agent's justification and their practical situation.  
6 This principle may fail in some cases of 'isolated second hand knowledge' (see Lackey 2010). However, isolated 
second hand knowledge only seems problematic when there is an expectation that we act only on first-hand 
knowledge. There is not such expectation in Medical Opinion 1: One seeks medical advice because one lacks the 
means and expertise to investigate one's condition oneself. Moreover, if the second opinion were not available then 
the audience would surely be warranted in acting on the first doctor's advice. This indicates that it is not the isolated 
and second hand nature of the testimonial belief which renders it unable to warrant action. 
 the first doctor has studied your condition intensively. She has spent the whole year 
analyzing every feature of your condition, your background, and your family. She has run all 
the tests that can be run. And she has read every relevant journal article.  Every ounce of 
evidence points toward you having condition-A. Although it is possible for her to seek a 
second opinion, we can imagine that the body of evidence she possesses is so overwhelming 
that this is not necessary. She is thus sufficiently justified to confidently assert, even in these 
circumstances, that you have condition-A. Indeed, given the overwhelming amount of 
evidence she possesses, it seems she can do so without asking for a second opinion from one 
of the other available doctors. In asserting that you have condition-A she is, in this case, 
acting on her belief that you have condition-A.
7
 If, upon accepting her testimony (believing 
on the basis of her testimony that you have condition-A) you acquire her justification, then 
you too should be in an epistemic position to act on p without seeking a second opinion. 
Nonetheless, since the second opinion is available at absolutely no cost, and since you do 
not know about the huge amount of work the first doctor has done,
8
 it still seems irrational 








                                                          
7 It is not obvious that assertion and knowledge have the same norm, nor that one is always acting on a belief that p 
when one asserts that p. Nonetheless, in this case the doctor is, in asserting that p, acting on her belief that p. 
8 This is not to say that you do not have reason to trust the doctor. Rather, it still seems irrational for you to act on the 
acquired belief without seeking a second opinion. Thus, the problem isn't that you are not positioned to accept the 
testimony, rather the problem is that the belief you form upon accepting the testimony does not have the same 
epistemic status as the doctor's belief 
9
    It is important that you do not know about the doctor’s stakes, or their overwhelming body of evidence. Otherwise 
you might not be obligated to seek a second opinion. 
 
10 This argument is, of course, also problematic for knowledge transmission. If knowledge is sufficient for action then 
the patient should receive the doctor's knowledge and be warranted in acting. Yet they are not warranted in acting. 
If knowledge is not sufficient for action then we need an account of what more is required.  This additional factor 
would have to vary between the doctor and the patient. Given the parallels between the practical situations of the 
doctor and patient it is hard to see what the additional factor could be. 
 One might question our intuitions about the case. Firstly, given that they have the word of an expert 
they trust, one might question whether the patient must really ask for a second opinion despite its 
immediate availability. To strengthen the intuition that one must acquire a second opinion  
Objections 
1. As we noted, justification transmission is standardly treated as an all or nothing affair. In 
response to the above, transmission theorists might deny this, and maintain that only part of the 
speaker’s justification is transmitted. Consequently, they can get the right prediction (that the 
audience does not acquire the amount of justification required for action). In order for this response 
to have any bite we are owed a story about the determinants of what is transmitted in a given case. 
Without such a story it is unclear what to make of the transmission theorist’s claim that audiences 
inherit, in a substantive way, the speaker’s justification. 
To complete their response, transmission theorist might, for example, hold that only the 
justification which constitutes the basis for the speaker’s assertion is transmitted, or that the 
audience’s belief only gains support from those reasons without which the speaker would not have 
made their assertion.
11
 However, our argument can be extended respectively to meet such modified 
views. It need only be stipulated that the speaker asserts on the basis of their total body of 
justification, or that the speaker only just met the threshold for rational assertion, meaning that they 
would not have asserted had any of their reasons been absent. This would make the audience’s 
belief counterfactually dependent on the speaker’s total body of reasons. It is unclear how any 
weakened transmission hypothesis can avoid mirroring-modifications of Medical Opinion 2 whilst 
remaining in the spirit of the transmission hypothesis. 
 
2. The transmission theorist could simply deny that one is obligated to seek a second opinion in 
Medical Opinion 2. They might argue that one is not always in a position to know one’s level of 
justification, and thus one is not always in a position to know what actions one can permissibly 
                                                          
11  Schmitt (2006) can be seen as advocating such a view.  
 undertake. In Medical Opinion 2 one can permissibly go straight to surgery, but one does not know 
this. 
We do not wish to hold that agents are always in a position to know their precise level of 
justification, or the precise courses of action they can permissibly undertake. However, it seems 
extremely implausible that the agent is permitted to act in Medical Opinion 2. There are two ways 
to bring this out. Firstly, consider a third-person version of our case: If a companion consulted with 
the doctors, and decided on the treatment for the patient, it would be justified of the patient to blame 
that companion for acting recklessly if, despite the easy availability of a second-opinion, they 
decided to base their decision on the opinion of the first expert they heard. It is hard to see why this 
would be if the doctor’s testimony was sufficient to warrant action in these circumstances.  
 Secondly, the stakes in Medical Opinion 2 can be manipulated to be arbitrarily high. For 
example, suppose that the cost of the wrong treatment is not the loss of some limbs, but rather 
eternal torture in hell. We can imagine that the risk for the doctor is eternal torture in a slightly 
worse bit of hell, and that the doctor’s justification is substantial enough to warrant assertion even 
in these circumstances. The transmission theorist would be forced to maintain that the patient 
should pursue the treatment simply on the basis of the doctor's recommendation, even in these 
circumstances. This seems extremely implausible. 
 
3. The transmission theorist could perhaps respond by holding that the availability of a second 
opinion constitutes a defeater. There are two ways this response could go. 
Firstly, the availability of a second opinion might be treated as a reason against belief 
(Schroeder (2012)). In this case, it would be weighed against the speaker/audience’s total body of 
justification, and play a role in determining their strength of justification. If the second opinion was 
only available to the audience then the audience’s level of justification would be lower than the 
doctor’s, since they have a reason to withhold. However, we postulated that this is not so. The 
 second opinion is also available to the doctor, but the doctor’s mass of evidence is so great that it 
outweighs their reasons to withhold, even given their stakes. 
One might insist that, since the second opinion is available to the doctor, they too should 
refrain from acting. The reasoning here would require that one must always seek a second opinion 
when one can. Otherwise the doctor’s evidence can be shifted to meet the threshold above which 
one needn’t seek a second opinion. We find this line of response unpersuasive. We think it is clear 
that agents can be epistemically saturated: one's evidence can be strong enough that one needn't 
seek further evidence, even if one can do so at very little cost. As we constructed the case, the 
doctor seems epistemically saturated. If the patient inherited the doctor’s epistemic state, they too 
would be epistemically saturated.  However, it doesn’t seem one can achieve epistemic saturation 
simply by accepting the testimony of a single doctor.   
Secondly, the transmission theorist could point to the distinction between justification and 
entitlement, maintaining that in order to inherit the speaker’s justification the audience must be 
entitled to accept their testimony (Burge (1993), Faulkner (2000) and Owens (forthcoming)). They 
could then maintain that the availability of a second opinion defeats the audience’s entitlement to 
accept the doctor’s testimony, thus preventing them from ever inheriting the doctor’s justification in 
the first place. 
This version of the defeat response can be deflected with only a small modification of our 
argument: We can modify Medical opinion 2 such that you are only told about the availability of a 
second opinion after you receive the first doctor’s testimony. In this situation your entitlement to 
accept the doctor’s testimony would not be defeated when testimony takes place, so you would 
acquire the doctor’s justification. (It seems clear that if, as far as you are aware, the first doctor’s 
testimony is all you have to go on, then you are warranted in acting on it). Yet it seems clear that 
once it becomes an option, you should, nonetheless, seek the second opinion before acting. So both 
versions of the objection fail. 
  
Conclusion 
The case against transmission views rests solely on the minimal assumption that rational action 
depends on one’s epistemic state in combination with one’s practical circumstances. We have seen 
that in some cases, despite the practical circumstances being relevantly parallel, a speaker and an 
audience are not equally within their rights to act on the content of the testimony. Hence, contrary 
to what transmission views tell us, their epistemic states must be different. The thing that sets 
transmission theorists apart from other theories here is precisely their core claim: that the speaker’s 
justification or knowledge becomes the audience’s justification or knowledge. 
We see two ways for the transmission theorist to avoid our argument: firstly, a radical re-
conceptualization of the relationship between action, one’s epistemic state, and one’s practical 
circumstances. Secondly: a radical re-conception of the relationship between the grounds for one’s 
justification to believe, and the grounds for one’s level of justification. We usually think of 
justification as closely tied to notions such as rationality and the normativity of action. However, 
the considerations presented here suggest that the transmission theorist must sever the connection 
between justification and permissible action. Other recent critiques of justification transmission (for 
example Barnett (2015)) put pressure on the connection between the transmission theorist’s notion 
of justification and internalist rationality. Without a connection to rationality or permissible action it 
is unclear what content or theoretical interest remains in the transmission theorist’s notion of 
justification. Thus, until the requisite re-conceptualizations are provided transmission theories must 
be treated with skepticism.
1213
 
                                                          
12 It might be worried that this argument is problematic for most theories of testimony: If one has reason to trust a 
speaker, and no reason to distrust them, and the speaker says that p, then one has reason to accept p. This may seem to 
imply that in the cases discussed so far, one would be rational in acting upon the first doctor’s opinion without 
consulting a second doctor. But this is fallacious. This further verdict depends on the relationship between the epistemic 
state brought about by acceptance of p and the norm of action. For instance, if one merely took justified belief (not 
knowledge) to result from justified acceptance, and at the same time took knowledge to be the norm of action, then one 
could avoid the prediction that one is justified in acting without seeking a second opinion (there are many similar 
options here). Secondly, one can avoid the implication by embracing pragmatic encroachment on justification, a move 
which does not seem available to the justification transmission theorist.  
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